“Yet aligning too closely with China risks angering the West further. This is the tightrope Bangladesh walks every day now.”

Md Tarek Hossain: On 21 July, 2025, a Bangladesh Air Force fighter jet fell from the sky over Diabari, Uttara. The F‑7 BGI slammed into Milestone School, killing students, mostly children under 16, teachers, and others in a moment too painful for words. For many of us, this was not just a tragedy of aviation—it felt like a metaphor for the fragile balance Bangladesh now faces between its defence needs, economic future, and the heavy influence of foreign powers.

The F‑7 BGI is a Chinese fighter jet, a relic of Cold War design upgraded with some modern tech. Bangladesh bought 16 of these jets from China in 2011. Why China? Because China sells cheaper. Because China does not ask too many political questions. Because China has been Bangladesh’s biggest supplier of military hardware for the last two decades.

But yesterday, the human cost of those defence decisions was no longer hidden behind airbase fences. The victims were not soldiers—they were students. Their families will ask why Bangladesh still flies these outdated jets over our cities in 2025.

Bangladesh’s military is modernising, but slowly, carefully, and mostly with Chinese equipment. Over 65% of Bangladesh’s defence imports come from China. Submarines, frigates, fighter jets, missile systems—even army rocket launchers—all bear the "Made in China" label. Some smaller purchases come from Russia. Recently, Turkey has become a new player, selling drones and rocket systems.

This is not a secret. It’s part of a strategy. Bangladesh cannot afford US or European prices. Western countries also put more conditions on arms sales—things like human rights, democracy, and regional behaviour. China simply sells, no lectures attached.

But this dependence comes with risks—technical risks, like the crash we just witnessed. Strategic risks, like what happens if Bangladesh’s future conflicts with China’s interests.

In June and July 2025, the United States increased tariff pressure on Bangladesh. Higher tariffs on garments—our biggest export—are already biting. Washington is unhappy with Bangladesh’s slow democratic reforms, labour rights, and its growing defence ties with China. Some in Washington also see Bangladesh as drifting too close to Beijing, not just militarily but also through infrastructure loans and economic projects.

The irony is heavy. We buy our warplanes from China because they’re cheap. We sell our garments to the US because Americans buy cheap. But now the US wants to punish us for being too friendly with China, and China’s planes just crashed in our capital. Between these two superpowers, Bangladesh feels very small.

First, we must admit the truth: Bangladesh’s foreign policy has long tried to “balance” everyone—China, India, the US, Russia, Europe. This strategy worked when the world was less divided. Now the world is splitting fast into camps. Choosing both sides may soon no longer be possible.

Economically, we depend on the West. The US and Europe buy most of our garments. They set the tone on tariffs, trade deals, and investment standards. If they impose more tariffs, our growth will suffer. Already, factories are closing. Workers are protesting. Politicians are nervous.

Militarily, we depend on China. No other country will sell us submarines, warships, jets, and missile systems at affordable prices. Replacing Chinese systems with Western ones would take years and billions we do not have.

Yet aligning too closely with China risks angering the West further. This is the tightrope Bangladesh walks every day now.

Ordinary Bangladeshis don’t think much about geopolitics. They think about jobs, safety, and fairness. After the Diabari crash, people see with their own eyes the costs of cheap, outdated military equipment flying over their children’s schools. After the new US tariffs, garment workers fear losing their paychecks.

For many, “foreign policy” feels distant until it touches their daily lives—through lost exports, through unsafe skies.

Bangladesh must rethink both its defence and economic strategies.

Defence: We need safer, more modern, more reliable systems. That might mean buying less, but better. Training, maintenance, and accountability must improve.

Economy: We cannot rely on garments alone. We need new exports, new industries, and to strengthen our domestic markets. We must improve labour rights, governance, and transparency—not because the US demands it, but because our people deserve it.

Most importantly, Bangladesh needs to communicate clearly to both China and the US that we want partnerships, not dependency. We respect both powers but belong to neither camp.

The Diabari tragedy reminds us that beneath geopolitics are human lives. Defence decisions are not just about planes and missiles—they’re about what falls from the sky onto our schools. Economic policies are not just numbers—they’re about who gets to eat, who gets to work.

Bangladesh’s future cannot be shaped only by fear of China or punishment from the US. It must be shaped by what protects and uplifts our people.

A foreign policy that starts with humanity, not hardware, is the only path forward.